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The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) conducts workplace
raids throughout the country' to locate undocumented immigrants.' Typi-
cally, the INS obtains information that a particular business may be em-
ploying undocumented workers and places the workplace under visual
surveillance. If some workers appear to fit a profile of undocumented im-
migrants, the INS proceeds with the raids, even though it has no knowl-
edge of the presence of any specific undocumented workers.'
1. See INS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 192 (1983) (table listing 35 cities
across country where INS conducts raids). Workplace raids are also known as business surveys or
factory sweeps. The general authority of the INS to question individuals is derived from the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, which grants agents "power without warrant-l) to interrogate any alien
or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States ....
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1982).
2. This Note will use the term "undocumented immigrant" in place of the pejorative term "illegal
alien." Undocumented immigrants are persons who have entered the country without inspection or
with false documents, who have overstayed their visas, who are working without authorization, or
who are otherwise in violation of immigration laws. See ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 626 n.1
(9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
Labeling individuals as "illegal," before there has been any judicial or administrative determina-
tion, fails to recognize that some workers who are undocumented may nevertheless be lawfully in the
country, or will be granted discretionary administrative relief. See Harwood, Arrests Without War-
rant: The Legal and Organizational Environment of mmigration Law Enforcement, 17 U.C.D. L.
REv. 505, 509-10 (1984) (describing eligibility for suspension of deportation). The term "illegal" is
also rejected because it ignores the reality of present immigration law. Lax border enforcement cou-
pled with the encouragement and facilitation of entry by some employers suggest that, even though
undocumented entry may be in technical violation of law, it has at times been welcomed by many
segments of American society with tacit governmental approval. See The Immigration Mess (Both of
Them), N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1985, at A38, col. 1 (editorial) ("[I]t is nominally illegal for undocu-
mented aliens to come to this country-but as long as employers have wanted their labor, no one has
gotten heavy about enforcing the law."); Illegal Workers as Domestics: Uneasy Alliance, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 30, 1985, at Cl, col. 3 (families need undocumented immigrants as housekeepers and INS does
not attempt to apprehend them).
3. See Sureck, 681 F.2d at 626. For example, INS agents may confirm the information merely by
observing that Hispanic workers enter the suspected workplaces. See id. at 627 n.5. The INS gains
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The raids begin when a group of 15 to 25 INS agents enter a work-
place without advance warning, surround the workers, and guard all ex-
its.4 The raids often begin with "workers' cries of 'la migra'. . followed
by attempts by some workers to hide or run. . . . " Agents move system-
atically through the workforce, displaying badges and directing pointed
questions at selected workers. Those workers believed to be undocumented
are handcuffed and taken away.6 The raids cause "confusion and pande-
monium" and generate considerable anxiety among the employees. One
worker has testified that she was afraid "[b]ecause if I leave and they
think I don't have no papers and they shoot me or something. '
In INS v. Delgado, the Supreme Court declared that workplace raids
involve no Fourth Amendment seizure because questioned workers were
free to walk away from the questioning." For the first time, a majority of
entry into the premises by obtaining either a search warrant or the consent of the establishment's
owner. The consent of the owner is secured for approximately 90% of raided workplaces. See id. at
626. Thus, the INS conceivably can lawfully enter most workplaces with no specific information
whatsoever.
Warrants used to authorize raids may be challenged as violative of the Fourth Amendment. Com-
pare International Molders' & Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, No. C-82-1896, slip
op. at 6-20 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 1985) (enjoining preliminary raids based on warrants that do not
identify specific individuals), denying request for stay of preliminary injunction, No. 85-2745, slip
op. (9th Cir. Dec. 2, 1985) with Blackie's House of Beef v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1226-27 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (warrants for raids need not identify specific individuals), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940
(1982). It is important to note that, if Congress authorizes sanctions for employers who hire undocu-
mented immigrants, see S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), employers are unlikely to consent to
raids. As a result, challenges to raids may become focused on the sufficiency of warrants.
4. See Sureck, 681 F.2d at 631-32; Delgado, 466 U.S. at 229-30 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
5. Sureck, 681 F.2d at 627.
6. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 230 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7. Id. at 237 n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting UNITED
STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL RIGHTS ISSuES IN
IMMIGRATION 90-91 (1980)). See also INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 3487 (1984) (raids
are chaotic).
8. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 237 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The raids
have stirred forceful protests by community groups, civil rights organizations, and public officials.
Described as "commando-like," Target: Illegal Aliens, NEWSWEEK, May 10, 1982, at 45, "terroris-
tic," Cranston Demands Immediate End to INS Raids, L.A. Times, Apr. 30, 1982, § I, at 3, col. 2
(quoting Sen. Cranston), and "paramilitary," id. at 23 (quoting Rev. Allan F. Deck of the Hispanic
Ministry Diocese of Orange County), they have been criticized as being designed "to cause the maxi-
mum amount of disruption to employers, workers and communities," id. at 3 (quoting Sen. Cranston).
9. The Court did not address the sufficiency of the warrants used to support two of the raids. 466
U.S. 210 (1984). The Court encountered workplace raids in only one other case. In INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984), the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to depor-
tation proceedings. Although the respondent had been apprehended during a workplace raid, the
Court did not discuss the constitutionality of the raid.
Without the exclusionary rule to deter the apprehension of undocumented immigrants through con-
stitutionally dubious tactics, it becomes even more important that the Court provide clear standards
that repudiate unconstitutional practices. The establishment of clear judicial standards would help the
INS to develop similarly clear administrative guidelines. INS agents seeking to abide by constitutional
constraints thus would more easily be able to modify their conduct accordingly. Consequently, INS
agents who may otherwise engage in unconstitutional tactics because of the abolition of the exclusion-
ary rule may still be restrained by internal controls. See id. at 3487-88 (INS internal regulations
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the Court explicitly endorsed the view that no Fourth Amendment interest
is at stake as long as an individual's freedom of movement is not re-
stricted, that is, when the individual is not detained.
This Note criticizes the restrictive definition of "seizure" that the Court
used in Delgado, and argues that a citizen or documented immigrant 0
subjected to citizenship questioning" during a workplace raid is "seized"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.1 2 The Note then proposes
that the INS be governed by constitutional restrictions similar to those
developed by courts to govern the police: The INS should be required to
base citizenship questioning on an individualized reasonable suspicion of
undocumented immigration. 3 Furthermore, this reasonable suspicion may
not be based on race, because doing so creates added intrusion under the
deter Fourth Amendment violations).
10. This Note assumes that documented immigrants and citizens are equally protected by the
Fourth Amendment, though the Supreme Court has not yet so ruled. At one point, although the
majority opinion did not reach the issue, four members of the Court expressed the view that docu-
mented immigrants are covered directly by the Fourth Amendment. See Abel v. United States, 362
U.S. 217, 248, 250 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 246-47 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also
Sureck, 681 F.2d at 639; United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294, 296 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975); Au Yi Lau
v. INS, 445 F.2d 217, 222-23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971). The interpretation that
"the people" in the Fourth Amendment includes all individuals is consistent with the Court's holding
that "person" in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments includes noncitizens. See, e.g., Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886) (documented immigrants entitled to equal protection).
As the Court has often recognized, the Fourth Amendment secures an indispensable liberty. See
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 274 (1973). The protection of privacy and personal
security is vital to the preservation of individual dignity regardless of an individual's immigration
status. See Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARv. L.
REV. 1286, 1335-36, 1406 (1983) (arguing that Court's willingness to extend constitutional guaran-
tees to documented immigrants responds to "humanitarian sentiments"); see also UNIVERSAL DECLA-
RATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1948) in HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL DoCuMENTS 10 (J. Joyce
ed. 1978) (U.S. agreed to provide immigrants with same entitlements as citizens).
Even if documented immigrants do not enjoy direct Fourth Amendment protection, they neverthe-
less receive indirect protection because of the danger that citizens may be mistaken for documented
immigrants, for it is clear that the rights of citizens cannot be reduced as a consequence of any lesser
entitlement enjoyed by documented immigrants. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
884 (1975) (power of Congress to regulate documented immigrants "cannot diminish the Fourth
Amendment rights of citizens who may be mistaken for aliens").
Undocumented immigrants, too, may enjoy some Fourth Amendment rights. See United States v.
Barbera, 514 F.2d 294, 296 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975) (Fourth Amendment protects all individuals); Babula
v. INS, 665 F.2d 293, 299 n.2 (3d Cir. 1981) (Adams, J., concurring) (undocumented immigrants
entitled to some protection since Fourth Amendment "speaks of 'the right of the people' and not the
rights of 'citizens"').
11. Citizenship questioning includes inquiries regarding citizenship status, proper documentation,
lawfulness of entry, place of birth, and related questions.
12. Although this Note focuses on workplace raids, its reasoning would also limit similar INS
practices, such as stopping individuals on the street or entering residences for citizenship questioning.
See, e.g., LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1327-28 (9th Cir. 1985) (entry into residences); Cheung
Tin Wong v. INS, 468 F.2d 1123, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (street encounter); Illinois Migrant Council
v. Pilliod, 398 F. Supp. 882, 887-90 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (street encounters and entry into residences),
aff'd, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976), modified as to remedy, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
13. Like the police, the INS is a law enforcement agency; it is authorized by statute to enforce
immigration laws and is empowered to conduct investigations, searches, and seizures and to make
arrests. See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1982).
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Fourth Amendment and also violates the equal protection guarantees of
the Fifth Amendment.
I. "SEIZURES" WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT
The Court's finding in Delgado that INS questioning of workers dur-
ing raids is not a Fourth Amendment seizure rested on a recently-
formulated test: an individual has been seized only when a reasonable
person under the same circumstances would not have felt free to walk
away." The Court's test, however, incorrectly equates the general liberty
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment with the specific right of
freedom of movement. Even though some stops for questioning-such as
citizenship questioning during workplace raids-are said to impose no re-
strictions on movement, they intrude so deeply on general liberty interests
that they should be regarded as "nondetentive seizures" under the Fourth
Amendment."5
A. "Seizures" Under the Fourth Amendment
The Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment "right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures" 6 to be the right of individuals to personal
security and privacy 7 free of arbitrary 8 and abusive 9 governmental in-
14. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215. Even under the Court's formula for a seizure, its view of the
facts left ample room for disagreement. The decision turned on the Court's finding that the INS
agents did not, by means of a show of authority, detain the workers. The Court's critical factual
interpretation was that the workers were unreasonable in inferring that the INS agents stationed at
all exits were there to keep them from leaving. According to the Court, the "obvious purpose of the
agents' presence at the factory doors was to insure that all persons in the factories were questioned."
Id. at 218.
It is difficult to imagine that a reasonable worker would have felt free to walk away when all exits
were guarded. A vigorous dissent criticized the majority opinion for its "studied air of unreality" and
found that the overall conditions resulted in detention. Id. at 226 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See supra text accompanying notes 4-8; see also Illinois Migrant Council v.
Pilliod, 531 F. Supp. 1011, 1019 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("when agents are stationed at points of egress, it is
only reasonable to infer that they are there in order to restrict egress").
15. Because courts have used the terms "detention" and "nondetention" synonymously with
"seizure" and "nonseizure," a "nondetentive seizure' would be an oxymoron under their terminology.
This Note argues for severance of the linkage between seizure and detention by showing that seizures
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment can occur without restrictions on movement.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. The privacy interest safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment is an individual's "reasonable
expectation of privacy." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
18. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9, 20-22 (1968); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
653-54 (1979).
19. The protection of the Fourth Amendment against abusive governmental interference has been
emphasized by the Court in its concern over the "'grave danger' of abuse of discretion." Prouse, 440
U.S. at 662 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976)). The same concern
is implicit in the Court's refusal to allow Fourth Amendment rights to be subject solely to the "unfet-
tered discretion of officers in the field." Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). Some commentators
have observed that it would be anomalous for the Fourth Amendment to protect against arbitrary, or
770
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terference. In elaborating on the "inestimable right of personal secur-
ity,"20 the Court has emphasized that "'[n]o right is held more sacred, or
is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable au-
thority of law."' 2
Before Delgado, the Court had formulated a broad conception of the
liberty interests embraced by the Fourth Amendment.22 For instance, in
Terry v. Ohio, the Court declared that "the sounder course is to recognize
that the Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public
upon personal security."23 Although all the cases in which the Court in-
validated a stop did, indeed, involve restrictions on movement, the Court
recognized in those situations that intrusions on liberty were caused not
only by the restrictions on movement,2 but also by the duration and na-
ture of questioning,2 5 and by the creation of anxiety, fear, or concern.26
Most importantly, in explaining opposite holdings in two cases where the
restrictions on movement were similar, the Court emphasized that the
"psychological" or "subjective" intrusion-the arousal of anxiety, fear, or
concern-was the "crucial distinction" between the two seizures. 27
indiscriminate, governmental interference but not abusive, or discriminatory, official invasions. See
Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and the Control of Police Discretion, 17 U. MICH. J.L. Rr. 551,
552-53 (1984); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 366
(1974).
20. Terry, 392 U.S. at 8-9.
21. Id. (quoting Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (emphasis added)).
22. The genesis of the Court's current test for a seizure was the opinion of Justice Stewart in
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), in a section joined by only one other Justice.
Justice Stewart's explication of the new test revealed the narrowed conception of Fourth Amendment
liberty his test implicitly assumed. After discussing the case law on investigative stops, Justice Stewart
concluded that "[wle adhere to the view that a person is 'seized' only when, by means of physical force
or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained." Id. at 553. Thus, in Justice Stewart's
view, the "liberty" interest protected in Terry was equivalent to the "freedom of movement." Any
restraints on liberty without a restriction on movement provided no "foundation whatever for invoking
constitutional safeguards." Id.
Before Delgado, the Stewart test for a seizure already had been endorsed by six members of the
Court in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1983) (plurality opinion); id. at 511-12 (Brennan,
J., concurring in the result); id. at 514 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But since a majority opinion did
not emerge in Royer, it was not until Delgado that the Stewart test was applied by a clear majority of
the Court.
23. 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.15 (1968).
24. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981) (respondent not free to leave dur-
ing search of his home); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657 (stop of car interfered with freedom of movement);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879-80 (1975) (same).
25. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (stop included demand for identification);
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 879-80 (stop involved visual inspection and brief questioning).
26. See, e.g., Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657 (stop is inconvenient and may create substantial anxiety);
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558 (stop generates concern and fright); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558
(stop may be threatening).
27. In one case, the Court upheld permanent checkpoint stops where all cars were slowed or
stopped even though INS agents did not have reasonable suspicion that any particular automobile or
occupant was involved in criminal activity. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). In
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Until Delgado, the Court never had intimated that the protection
against subjective intrusions was wholly dependent on a finding of a re-
striction on movement. By adopting this unduly narrow view of Fourth
Amendment liberty interests, the Court in Delgado failed to guard ade-
quately against subjective intrusions inflicted without a restriction on
movement. Freedom from governmental interference, though, should not
be any less protected merely because an intrusion is caused by nondeten-
tive enforcement tactics. Therefore, the Court should focus its Fourth
Amendment inquiry on whether a reasonable person would have felt an
intrusion rather than limit its analysis to whether a reasonable person
would have felt detained.
B. Citizenship Questioning Results in a Seizure
Citizenship questioning by the INS causes severe subjective intrusions
on minority citizens and documented immigrants and should be recognized
as a Fourth Amendment seizure. Minorities-the targets of most citizen-
ship questioning by the INS28-generally find encounters with law en-
forcement officers more intrusive than nonminorities because of fear of
discriminatory abuse."9 Studies have indicated that police investigative
practices engender resentment and hostility in minority communities, and
minority groups have frequently charged that police practices are carried
out in a racially discriminatory manner in order to harass.
3 0 Recognizing
the second case, the Court invalidated stops of automobiles by the roving patrol of the INS where the
agents did not have reasonable suspicion that the automobile or any occupant stopped was involved in
illegal activity. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). In Delaware v. Prouse, the
Court explained the "crucial distinction" between Martinez-Fuerte and Brignoni-Ponce: "'[The] ob-
jective intrusion-the stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection-also existed in roving-
patrol stops. But we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the subjective intrusion-the
generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the case of
a checkpoint stop.', 440 U.S. at 656 (quoting Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558).
28. See infra note 56.
29. The Court has noted that "the degree of community resentment aroused by particular prac-
tices is clearly relevant to an assessment of the quality of the intrusion upon reasonable expectations of
personal security caused by those practices." Terry, 392 U.S. at 17 n.14. Several senators have indi-
cated concern about the "feeling of hysteria" expressed by members of the Hispanic community over
Operation Jobs, which was a weeklong period of intensive workplace raids by the INS in April 1982.
See Comment, INS Surveys of Business Establishments: Reasonable, Individualized Suspicion of
Illegal Alienage, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 632, 653 n.1 10 (1983).
30. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 14-15 (minorities frequently complain of wholesale harassment by the
police); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE IN THE SousHwasT 2-11 (1970) (complaints of discriminatory tactics by police include exces-
sive use of force, verbal abuse, and frequent stops for "investigation"); Alderete, The Use of Physical
Force by Police-A Perennial Chicano Community Dilemma, in NATIONAL HISPANIC CONFERENCE
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE at 193-213 (1980); see also Davis v. Mississippi,
394 U.S. 721, 722 (1969) (overturning rape conviction of black youth, who was one of 65-75 black
youths rounded up by police in dragnet investigation); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 366-67 (1976)
(class action suit claiming pervasive pattern of mistreatment of minorities by police); City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 116 n.3 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disproportionate number of
black victims killed by chokeholds by police).
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this greater intrusion on minorities in a Fourth Amendment context, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall observed that, as a black
female, the respondent "may have felt unusually threatened by the of-
ficers, who were white males. '3 1
Citizenship questioning, even without detention, far exceeds the kind of
intrusions caused by ordinary police questioning; by conveying doubt
about an individual's right to belong in the country, it strikes at the heart
of one's claim to actual equal membership in society. Like others who
have faced widespread discrimination, Hispanics-specifically targeted by
the INS-cannot take for granted the right to full participation in Ameri-
can society. Thus, questioning by INS agents that challenges one's right to
be in the country at all-much less one's claim to equal membership-is
likely to be acutely disturbing and, therefore, enormously intrusive.32
This Note will argue below that the explicit use of racial characteristics
by the INS in choosing whom to question violates equal protection.33
However, even if it is decided that this use of race is not in strict violation
of the equal protection clause, the norms embodied in equal protec-
tion-repugnance to disadvantaging racial classifications-should inform
the analysis of the Fourth Amendment issues. Where investigation is
largely directed by race, Fourth Amendment doctrine should recognize
that members of minority groups will be especially resentful, because ra-
cial characteristics are the immutable traits upon which unlawful discrim-
ination in other areas is based. Therefore, the heightened subjective intru-
sion experienced by minority workers should be recognized as a
significant invasion on valid Fourth Amendment interests."'
31. 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980) (drug courier case). The Justices deemed the considerations "not
irrelevant" but not "decisive." Id.
32. See Reeves, Reporter at Large-Boyle Heights and Beyond, NEw YORKER, Sept. 14, 1981, at
116, 130 (Mexican American found citizenship questioning "gives you the feeling that you don't
really belong here. . . .You're always ready to prove you're a citizen, that you're an American, that
you belong."); Harwood, supra note 2, at 530-31 (Mexican Americans express annoyance at being
mistaken for undocumented immigrant); see also Delgado, 466 U.S. at 230 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (INS agents warned worker, a citizen, that they would return to check
on him because he spoke English too well).
More generally, nondetentive encounters that a reasonable person would find offensive should be
regulated by the Fourth Amendment. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 ("courts still retain their traditional
responsibility to guard against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing"); United States v.
Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1343 (2d Cir. 1979) (in allowing stop of suspected drug courier, court noted
that "[t]here was no evidence of harassment, intimidation, physical restraint, humiliation or pro-
longed questioning") (emphasis added); People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 217, 352 N.E.2d 562,
567-68, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380-81 (1976) ("Despite the lack of a forcible seizure[,] . . . any time an
intrusion on the security and privacy of the individual is undertaken with intent to harass or is based
upon mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, the spirit of the Constitution has been violated ... .
33. See infra text accompanying notes 66-83.
34. See Marquez v. Kiley, 436 F. Supp. 100, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("dominant role which physi-
cal or racial appearance inevitably plays in the officers' decision to stop and inquire . . . adds signifi-
cant Fourteenth Amendment overtones").
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON NONDETENTIVE INS SEIZURES
A. The Fourth Amendment Balancing Test
Like a police force, the INS in enforcing immigration laws fulfills a law
enforcement function and should be governed by the same Fourth Amend-
ment principles that limit police activity. Courts, however, have been
uniquely deferential to enforcement activities of the INS; they have not, in
any rigorous, systematic fashion, used Fourth Amendment restrictions on
police practices to govern INS activities."5 The nonsensical result is that a
citizen or documented immigrant's Fourth Amendment rights are less jeal-
ously guarded when she is confronted and questioned by the INS seeking
undocumented immigrants than when she is confronted and questioned by
the police or the Federal Bureau of Investigation seeking armed robbers
or murderers.
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court established that some police con-
duct that falls short of a "technical arrest" or a "full-blown search" never-
theless is governed by the Fourth Amendment. In that case, a police of-
ficer noticed two men taking turns walking back and forth numerous
times along an identical route, pausing each time to stare into the same
store, and then conferring together immediately after each trip. Suspecting
imminent criminal activity, the officer approached the men to question
and frisk them.3"
35. See generally Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1
(1984) (immigration is area in which governmental authority is at "zenith" and individual rights at
"nadir"). Congress in some instances may have greater authority with respect to individuals already
determined to be noncitizens. INS enforcement activity, however, is part of the process of identifying
those noncitizens, and'inevitably brings the INS into contact with citizens. When noncitizens cannot
be singled out, the reasons for deference do not apply.
The courts' deference also may be based on the fact that deportation is a civil proceeding and that
civil sanctions are usually less severe than criminal penalties. Since INS law enforcement is said to
involve ultimately less punishment, it may not need to be evaluated as strictly as criminal law enforce-
ment. Id. at 24-27. In addition, the risk of abuse by the police may be higher than by the INS to the
extent that the police potentially can impose a broader range of harsh consequences than the INS.
Although the INS may subject a lawfully present individual to harassing questions, the individual
ultimately can prove conclusively her legality by producing, for example, an American birth certifi-
cate. An individual stopped by the police, however, usually cannot prove his innocence of criminal
charges with the same amount of certainty.
Even though deportation is considered a civil proceeding, however, punishment under the immigra-
tion laws often is as severe as a criminal penalty. Deportation may leave an individual stateless as
well as cause loss of a job and separation from family members. Id. at 25-27. Even assuming that the
civil penalty is less onerous, it does not follow that enforcement of civil statutes necessarily involves
less intrusion than enforcement of criminal laws. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34. In addi-
tion, the risk of discriminatory abuse and short-term incarceration by the INS, in conditions that may
be deplorable, is still substantial, especially for minority individuals. See, e.g., Garcia v. INS, No. 82-
F-680, slip op. at 23 (D. Colo. Nov. 4, 1982) (INS detention center unconstitutional because of
inadequate food and bedding, unsanitary drinking and bathing facilities, and unjustified strip
searches). Being required to prove lawful presence, even when it can be shown conclusively, is itself
an indignity.
36. Terry, 392 U.S. at 4-7, 22-23.
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Faced with a situation in which the officer indisputably lacked probable
cause to arrest the defendants for any crime until weapons were actually
discovered, the Court refused either to insist on probable cause and leave
the police powerless to investigate suspicious behavior or to isolate the
encounter from Fourth Amendment scrutiny and leave this kind of intru-
sion unregulated.3 7 The Court instead adopted a middle ground by decid-
ing that a seizure had occurred and by using the general Fourth Amend-
ment requirement of reasonableness 8 to evaluate "an entire rubric of
police conduct . . .[that involves] necessarily swift action predicated upon
the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat . . .,,"
To assess the reasonableness of the stop-and-frisk, the Court invoked a
balancing test, weighing the governmental interests served by the seizure
against the interference with Fourth Amendment liberties that the seizure
entailed.40 As a result, the Court introduced the new standard of reasona-
ble suspicion-instead of probable cause-to judge a stop-and-frisk. The
Court stressed, however, that, "in justifying the particular intrusion the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably war-
rant that intrusion" as a means to prevent or detect crime.41
Although Terry itself was expressly limited to a stop-and-frisk,42 its
reasoning has since been used more generally to support what are often
called Terry stops-investigative seizures by law enforcement officers that
involve a brief detention. In cases involving Terry stops by the police, the
Supreme Court without exception has conditioned the authority to detain
an individual under the Fourth Amendment on a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.43 Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly observed in
37. Id. at 16-20.
38. Id. at 19-20, 24-27.
39. Id. at 20. Before Terry, probable cause was the standard against which searches and seizures
were reviewed. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1979); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at
35-39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
40. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21.
41. Id. at 21. Reasonable suspicion may not be satisfied by any "inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or 'hunch."' Id. at 27. The requirement of reasonable suspicion ensures that a particular
seizure has a sufficient likelihood of advancing the governmental interest in question. See Mertens,
supra note 19, at 552-53.
In addition, the scope of the intrusion must be limited. The Court in Terry, 392 U.S. at 27-30, was
careful to ensure that the scope of the officer's actions was reasonably related to the circumstances thatjustified initiation of the encounter. In subsequent cases, the Court has continued to stress thatseizures must involve limited intrusions to be considered under the balancing test. See Michigan v.Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699 (1981) ("some seizures admittedly covered by the Fourth Amendment
constitute such limited intrusions on the personal security of those detained and are justified by such
substantial law enforcement interests that they may be made on less than probable cause").
42. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
43. See, e.g., Summers, 452 U.S. at 699 (suspicion of criminal activity required to support
seizure); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (same).
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those cases that reasonable suspicion was based on specific information
about the particular individual questioned.""
The recent use of two police enforcement techniques-roadblocks and
airport stops-suggests that in some circumstances the police may be per-
mitted to make stops on less than individualized suspicion. For instance,
in Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court mentioned in dicta that the
questioning of all motorists at roadblocks, since it would not involve the
"unconstrained exercise of discretion," 45 may be an acceptable alternative
to individualized suspicion for each motorist stopped. Lower court cases,
addressing roadblock stops primarily aimed at motorists driving while in-
toxicated (DWI), have divided on their constitutionality.
46 Those courts
that have approved DWI roadblocks have relied on the important state
interest in promoting traffic safety.
47
Similar issues are raised when narcotics agents stop individuals at air-
ports on the basis of a "drug courier profile."
48 In the only case in which
a majority of the Supreme Court explicitly addressed the constitutionality
of a profile, the Court rejected its use because it was overinclusive: the
profile "describe[d] a very large category of presumably innocent trav-
elers." 49 Recently, however, a plurality of the Court allowed the use of a
drug courier profile, but apparently only after finding that individualized
suspicion was present: the police had discovered that the particular de-
44. See, e.g., Summers, 452 U.S. at 699 n.9 (In commenting on Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85
(1979), the Court observed, "we held that police executing a search warrant at a tavern could not
invoke Terry to frisk a patron unless the officers had individualized suspicion that the patron might be
armed or dangerous."); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) ("we have required the officers to
have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal
activity").
45. 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
46. Compare, e.g., Little v. State 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984) and State v. Coccomo, 177
N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131, (N.J. Super. Ct. 1980) (approving DWI roadblocks) with State ex
rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Ct. of Arizona, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983) (en banc) and Common-
wealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983) (invalidating DWI roadblocks). See
generally Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver Under the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of
Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEo. L.J. 1457, 1460-63 (1983).
47. See, e.g., Little, 300 Md. at 504-05, 479 A.2d at 912-13; see also Note, supra note 46, at
1460-61.
48. For example, in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493 n.2 (1983), the defendant: (i) carried
heavy American Tourister luggage; (ii) was apparently 25-35 years old; (iii) was casually dressed;
(iv) appeared pale and nervous and was looking around; (v) paid for his ticket with a large number of
bills; and (vi) omitted his address and telephone number when he filled out an airline identification
tag. See generally Note, Criminal Profiles After United States v. Mendenhall: How Well-Founded a
Suspicion?, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 557, 561 n.31.
49. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam). In a case decided one month before
Reid, United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), the Court upheld an airport stop. Three
concurring Justices discussed with approval the use of the profile in the case, but maintained that
"reliance upon the 'drug courier profile' [would not] necessarily demonstrate reasonable suspicion."
Id. at 565 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The remaining two
Justices in the majority upheld the encounter because they found it was consensual. Id. at 555-57
(opinion of Stewart, J.).
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fendant was travelling under an assumed name." With the discovery of
the additional factor, the cumulative set of articulable facts was no longer
overinclusive, because it distinguished the defendant from innocent
travellers.5
The Court also has applied the balancing test to the area of immigra-
tion law enforcement, concluding that stops for citizenship questioning are
measured against the standard of reasonable suspicion.5 2 In finding no
detention in Delgado, however, the Court did not reach the question of
whether INS stops at workplaces, like police stops, must be based on spe-
cific information about the particular individual questioned. In analyzing
this question, comparison of the individual and governmental interests for
both INS stops and police stops shows that the INS should be at least as
constrained as the police.
1. The Individual Interests
In evaluating the intrusiveness of a law enforcement technique, the
Court has focused on the degree of interference likely to be suffered by
innocent individuals.5 3 Since the vast majority of undocumented immi-
grants sought by the INS belong to minority groups, it is reasonable to
think that minorities account for a larger proportion of the innocent indi-
viduals seized by the INS compared to those seized by the police. Specifi-
cally, during workplace raids, the INS focuses questioning on Hispanic
workers, including citizens and documented immigrants, because of the
convergence of three factors. First, most undocumented immigrants are
50. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (four Justices). A fifth Justice rejected the factors
in the profile because "considered individually or collectively, they are perfectly consistent with inno-
cent behavior . . . ." Id. at 512 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result).
51. Similarly, lower courts, grappling with whether particular sets of facts contain individualizing
"suspicious" characteristics, have identified specific factors-whether or not elements of a pro-
file-that contribute to individualized suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Elsoffer, 671 F.2d 1294,
1297 (11th Cir. 1982) (bulge beneath clothing); United States v. Nembhard, 676 F.2d 193, 201 (6th
Cir. 1982) (defendants attempted to conceal that they were travelling together); United States v.
Black, 675 F.2d 129, 137 (7th Cir. 1982) (use of alias and heightened nervousness), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1068 (1983); see also United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 601 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) ("we
will assign no characteristic greater or lesser weight merely because the characteristic happens to be
present on, or absent from, the profile"). See generally Latzer, Royer, Profiles and the EmergingThree-Tier Approach to the Fourth Amendment, 11 AM. J. CRIM. L. 149 (1983); Note, Drug Cou-
rier Profiles in Airport Stops: Legitimate Equivalents of Reasonable Suspicion?, 14 Sw. U.L. REv.
315 (1984).
52. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880-82 (1975) (applying reasonable sus-
picion standard to stops of automobiles by INS roving patrols).
53. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1979) (invalidating random stops for
license checks because of high ratio of licensed to unlicensed drivers); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882(stop of car by roving patrol for citizenship check without reasonable suspicion that particular car
contained undocumented immigrants would subject motorists "to potentially unlimited interference
with their use of the highways").
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Hispanic.54 Second, the INS cannot reliably differentiate by observation
among citizens, documented immigrants, and undocumented immigrants.
55
Third, courts so far have permitted the INS to use race as a major factor
in the selection of individuals for questioning.
56 Thus, in the aggregate,
because minorities find encounters with law enforcement officers more in-
trusive than do nonminorities, 57 citizenship questioning by the INS during
workplace raids interferes more severely with innocent individuals than
Terry stops by the police.
2. The Governmental Interests
The public interest in controlling undocumented immigration is usually
justified by the economic, social, and political harm caused to the United
States by the presence of undocumented immigrants.
58 A decade ago, the
Supreme Court asserted that undocumented immigrants "create signifi-
cant economic and social problems, competing with citizens and legal resi-
54. See Corwin, The Numbers Game: Estimates of Illegal Aliens in the United States,
1970,1981, LAw & CONTEMP. PRoms., Spring 1982, at 223, 246, 259.
55. As Justice Brennan has stated:
Indeed, the proposition that INS agents, even those who have considerable experience in the
field, will be able fairly and accurately to distinguish between Spanish-speaking persons of
Mexican ancestry who are either native-born or naturalized citizens, and Spanish-speaking
persons of Mexican ancestry who are aliens is both implausible and subject to discriminatory
abuse.
Delgado, 466 U.S. at 234 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886 ("Large numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the physical
characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry, and even in the border area a relatively small pro-
portion of them are aliens."); United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 860 (9th Cir. 1973) (impossi-
ble to determine by observation whether person of apparent Mexican ancestry is American citizen,
Mexican national with proper entry papers, or undocumented).
56. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. The INS appears to be looking primarily for
undocumented Mexican immigrants during workplace raids. During Operation Jobs, 80% of those
arrested were Mexican nationals. See Target: Illegal Aliens, supra note 8, at 45. Since the raided
workplaces do not employ undocumented immigrants exclusively, many citizens and documented im-
migrants are affected. In the Delgado raids, at least one-half of the workforce consisted of citizens or
documented immigrants. See ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom.
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); see also International Molders' and Allied Workers' Local
Union No. 164 v. Nelson, No. C-82-1896, slip op. at 31-36 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 1985) (numerous
citizens and documented immigrants questioned, threatened, and physically abused by INS during
workplace raids). Most of those citizens and documented immigrants are likely to be Hispanic. See id.
Moreover, repeated raids of the same workplaces by the INS aggravate the overall intrusiveness of the
enforcement activity. For example, in Sureck the same factory was raided twice, 681 F.2d at 627. In
Blackie's House of Beef v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1213-16 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
940 (1982), the same restaurant was raided twice.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
58. Estimates of the number of undocumented immigrants in the country have ranged from one to
twelve million. See, e.g., SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMI-
GRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
36
(1981) [hereinafter cited as SELECT COMMISSION FINAL REPORT] (estimating 3.5-5.0 million); Com-
ment, supra note 29, at 646 n.78 (citing studies). Most recently, a study requested by the INS chal-
lenged the higher estimates and found the figure to be between 2 and 4 million. See Number of Illegal
Aliens in U.S. May Be as Low as 2 Million, New Study Contends, L.A. Times, June 25, 1985, § 1,
at 4, col. 1.
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dent aliens for jobs, and generating extra demand for social services." 59
Workplace raids are thought to be needed by the INS because of the diffi-
culty of guarding the nation's borders. Since many undocumented immi-
grants enter the country to seek employment, workplace raids "strike di-
rectly at th[e] cause, enabling the INS with relatively few agents to
diminish the incentive for the dangerous passage across the border and to
apprehend large numbers of those who come."' However, not even the
Supreme Court seems to believe today that undocumented immigration is
as big a problem as had been previously thought. The Court recently
noted that undocumented immigrants "underutilize public services" and
are not a burden on a state economy.61 The Court's shifting views reflect
a deep division among researchers on the overall impact of undocumented
immigration. 2
Ultimately, even assuming that undocumented immigration imposes
major social costs, the costs are certainly far lower than those caused by
the crimes that Terry stops by the police are meant to control, such as the
illicit sale and distribution of narcotics.6 3 Despite the enormous social
costs of narcotics trafficking, the Court has not allowed police officers
fighting narcotics to conduct Terry stops without individualized suspicion
of criminal activity." The INS-combatting a problem of less magni-
tude-should be at least as circumscribed.
This initial comparison suggests that there is no reason to categorically
allow the INS greater authority than the police. Citizenship questioning
by the INS involves a greater personal intrusion to serve a less important
governmental interest than Terry stops by the police.6 5
59. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878-79.
60. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
61. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982).
62. See, e.g., COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HUMAN RESOURCES AGENCY, A STUDY OF THE SOCIO-
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ILLEGAL ALIENS ON THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 173 (1977), cited in Com-
ment, Equal Protection for Undocumented Aliens, 5 CHICANO L. REV. 29, 36 n.40 (1981) (annual
cost of undocumented immigrants to San Diego County is $2 million in social services; gain is $48.8
million in taxes); SELECT COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 38-42 (undocumented
immigrants do not place substantial burden on social services but they displace or depress wages of
some American workers and form underclass); Salinas & Torres, The Undocumented Mexican Alien:
A Legal, Social, and Economic Analysis, 13 Hous. L. REV. 863, 876-84 (1976) (undocumented
immigrants depress wages, displace American workers, drain public resources, fail to pay taxes, cause
animosity toward Hispanics, and inhibit political participation of Hispanics).
63. The social costs of narcotics trafficking include: deaths from overdoses and drug-related
crimes, addiction, street crime by drug users, money to support organized crime, drug abuse by adoles-
cents, deterioration of the "moral fabric" of society; and various economic and property losses. See,
e.g., Trafficking and Abuse of Narcotics in the Northeast United States: Hearing Before the House
Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
65. A more extensive comparison between workplace raids and specific police practices will be
undertaken below; see infra text accompanying notes 88-102.
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B. Equal Protection Under the Fifth Amendment
Beyond the Fourth Amendment problems, INS workplace raids raise
serious Fifth Amendment concerns as well."
6 Under equal protection anal-
ysis, classifications that impose burdens on the basis of race are subjected
to strict scrutiny.67 Such classifications bear a "very heavy burden of justi-
fication;"'68 the ends must be a compelling governmental interest and the
means must be precisely tailored to advance that purpose.
6 9 Since the INS
uses race as a means to select individuals to impose the burden of citizen-
ship questioning," the racial classification employed by the INS must be
subjected to strict scrutiny.
1. Compelling Governmental Interest
There is only one case in which the Supreme Court has approved a
racial classification explicitly disadvantaging a minority after subjecting it
to strict scrutiny. In Korematsu v. United States, the Court upheld the
wartime exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from a West Coast
military area.71 To justify use of such a racial classification, the Court
required the government to demonstrate a "[p]ressing public necessity,"
which the Court found was supplied by the needs of the military during a
time of war.
72
In two immigration law enforcement cases, the Court has declared that
the INS may impose citizenship questioning on the basis of race. In
neither case, however, did the Court even mention equal protection or
strict scrutiny. With respect to INS roving patrols, the Court found that
"Mexican appearance [is] a relevant factor" in the selection of motorists to
detain.7 3 With respect to stops of vehicles at permanent checkpoints, the
Court found that "even if it be assumed that such referrals [to secondary
66. One exception may be the use of race when it is part of a description to identify a particular
individual. The use of race as part of a particularized description rather than an "alien" or "drug
courier" profile is less susceptible to abuse because only that particular individual, or someone closely
resembling that person, may be stopped. It is important that there are sufficient nonracial elements in
order for the description to be truly individualized. See generally Johnson, Race and the Decision to
Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 242-43 (1983).
67. For a general discussion, see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L.
REv. 1065, 1087-1132 (1969). For the federal government, equal protection is included under the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Administrative
classifications, such as those used by the INS, are within the scope of Fifth Amendment protection.
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidating laundry ordinance administered discrimi-
natorily against the Chinese).
68. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
69. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982).
70. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
71. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
72. Id. at 216-19.
73. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975).
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inspection areas] are made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican an-
cestry, we perceive no constitutional violation."' 4 The Court apparently
viewed race as just another factor relied on by the INS. The Court consid-
ered the use of race solely under existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and
concluded that its predictive value was sufficiently high and the apprehen-
sion of undocumented immigrants sufficiently important to permit its use.
But where race is employed as a "suspicious" factor for law enforcement
purposes, the Fifth Amendment should come into play. The use of race
should not be permitted unless the government can meet its "very heavy
burden of justification."
Factory raids-or any other enforcement operations-performed by the
INS do not advance a governmental interest that even approaches the
magnitude of the one asserted in Korematsu. The possible protection of
jobs and services-even if the loss were as great as the INS claims-does
not begin to rise to the level of defending the United States against possi-
ble espionage during wartime. Before the INS should be allowed to use a
racial classification, it should be required to demonstrate a pressing public
necessity, a showing that it is unlikely to be able to make. 5
2. Precisely Tailored Means
Even a pressing public necessity will not justify a burdensome racial
classification if the classification is not necessary or precisely tailored to
serve the governmental interest."6 The use of race by the INS satisfies
neither requirement. The classification is grossly overinclusive in that
there are 14.6 million Hispanics" as compared to an estimated 3.0-4.3
million undocumented Hispanic immigrants 8 in the country. Thus, be-
74. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976); see also Garcia v. INS, No.
82-F-680, slip op. at 7 (D. Colo. Nov. 4, 1982) (suspicion based in part on workers' Hispanic ap-
pearance and attire). The use of race by the INS affects Asian Americans as well. See, e.g., Yam Sang
Kwai v. INS, 411 F.2d 683, 687 (D.C. Cir.) (INS agent, "upon entering the carryout, confronted the
petitioner,. . . obviously a person of foreign descent, with questions concerning his right to be in the
United States"), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 877 (1969).
75. See Johnson, supra note 66, at 249 (arguing that apprehension of undocumented immigrants
does not promote pressing public necessity). Since the burden is on the government to justify its use of
racial factors, uncertainty regarding the strength of the governmental purpose favors abandonment of
the racial classification. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9, 11 (1967); see also supra text accompa-
nying notes 58-62.
76. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982). Accordingly, the racial classification employed by
the INS should be rejected if it is unnecessary, even though it may increase the apprehension of
undocumented immigrants. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (because of exis-
tence of race-neutral statutes forbidding all promiscuous conduct, statute specifically prohibiting inter-
racial cohabitation was unnecessary, and therefore, unconstitutional).
77. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA
DATA BOOK 4 (1982).
78. The figures are based on the estimate of 3.5-5.0 million undocumented immigrants reported
by the President's Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, see supra note 58, and the
estimate that 85% of all undocumented immigrants are Hispanic, see Corwin, supra note 54 at
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cause of the imprecision of the classification, many lawfully present His-
panics are seized for citizenship questioning because of their race.
7"
The racial classification is also substantially underinclusive in that
about 15% of all undocumented immigrants are not Hispanic.
8 By rely-
ing on race, the INS focuses disproportionately on individuals who appear
to the INS to be Hispanic. For example, even though undocumented
Mexican immigrants are estimated to constitute no more than 60% of the
total population of undocumented immigrants in the United States,"' they
consistently account for about 90% of the undocumented immigrants ap-
prehended by the INS, while undocumented immigrants from other coun-
tries go undetected.82 The INS's use of racial factors to target undocu-
mented Mexicans causes Hispanic citizens and documented immigrants to
be disproportionately seized for citizenship questioning, in comparison to
lawfully present individuals of other racial groups. The INS's use of race
is thus impermissible under equal protection analysis.
83
III. A STANDARD FOR NONDETENTIVE SEIZURES
To protect the Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights of citizens and doc-
umented immigrants working in establishments raided by the INS, the
INS must not be permitted to question a worker about her citizenship
without individualized reasonable suspicion of undocumented immigra-
tion (or illegal alienage). For, as this Note has argued, citizenship ques-
tioning violates the Fourth Amendment, even when the worker questioned
is free to walk away. The proposed standard is the same as the one used
to review detentive seizures by the police, with "undocumented immigra-
tion" substituted for "criminal activity."
84
248-50; Johnson, supra note 66, at 250 n.222.
79. Even though other factors may be used in combination with race, race should not be consid-
ered an additional "suspicious" factor because of this overinclusiveness.
80. See supra note 78.
81. See Corwin, supra note 54, at 246, 259; SELECr COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note
58, at 36.
82. See Comment, supra note 29, at 647 n.82.
83. A remaining element of equal protection analysis is the availability of alternatives that would
obviate the need for a racial classification, which is an important consideration under Fourth Amend-
ment analysis as well. The feasibility of alternatives and their constitutional significance will be dis-
cussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 95-102.
84. Three different standards have been used by the federal courts to review questioning by the
INS. Three circuits have adopted a dual standard. Under the upper tier, the Fourth Amendment
requires that detentive questioning be justified by individualized reasonable suspicion of illegal alien-
age. Under the lower tier, the INS is restricted by statute, see supra note 1, to conduct nondetentive
questioning only when supported by individualized reasonable suspicion of alienage. See LaDuke v.
Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1331-32 (9th Cir. 1985); Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 548 F.2d 715
(7th Cir. 1977) (en banc); Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217, 222-23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 864 (1971).
A second standard, employed by one district court, permits detentive questioning based on individu-
alized reasonable suspicion of alienage. See Garcia v. INS, No. 82-F-680, slip op. at 13-15 (D. Colo.
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A. The Standard for Detentive Seizures by the Police
The standard for detentive seizures by the police is individualized rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal activity.85 The requirement of individualized
information serves two functions: in requiring more specific evidence, it
lowers the number of erroneous intrusions; in reducing the discretion
available to law enforcement officers, it limits the possibility that the dis-
cretion will be exercised in a discriminatory manner.8 6
B. Applying the Police Standard to INS Workplace Raids
As argued earlier, there is insufficient reason to vest greater authority
in the INS than in the police.87 The particular considerations involved in
INS workplace raids support the application of the police standard to
raids, and differentiate the raids from roadblocks and airport stops.88
Those considerations are: (i) the overtly racial aspects of INS enforce-
ment, (ii) the lesser need for immediate apprehension, (iii) the chilling
effect on the employment of Hispanic citizens and documented immi-
grants, and (iv) the availability of alternatives.
Since the INS interacts primarily with racial minorities, the risk of
abusive questioning is heightened.89 Requiring the INS to formulate indi-
vidualized reasonable suspicion-which means a standard not based on
Nov. 4, 1982). Finally, the Third Circuit has permitted detentive questioning with a more open-ended
Fourth Amendment requirement that the scope of an intrusion be reasonably related to its purpose,
but not necessarily supported by individualized information. See Babula v. INS, 665 F.2d 293,
295-97 (3d Cir. 1981).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 43-51.
86. In Delgado, Justice Powell, the only Justice to discuss the issue of individualized suspicion,
concluded that such suspicion was unnecessary for citizenship questioning during workplace raids. He
analogized factory raids to the permanent checkpoint stops approved in Martinez-Fuerte-the only
type of Terry stop for which the Court has expressly waived the requirement of individualized suspi-
cion. 466 U.S. at 221-24 (Powell, J., concurring in the result). The Court's decision in Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561-64 (1976), turned on the finding that the stops were very limited
intrusions.
Justice Powell's analogy is flawed because the factors that minimize the intrusiveness of permanent
checkpoints are not present in workplace raids. In contrast to motorists who approach well-marked
permanent checkpoints, workers in factories are not forewarned but are taken by surprise by the entry
of the INS. Factory raids generate fear and concern among the workers and are more disruptive than
checkpoint stops. See ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. INS
v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984). The location of the factories in the interior of the country, unlike
the location of permanent checkpoints on main roads leading away from the border, adds to the
amount of surprise. See Note, The Requirement of Individualized Suspicion: An End to INS Factory
Sweeps?, 59 CHi.[-]KErr L. REv. 1069, 1092 (1984). The Court since Delgado has noted that during
factory raids, "[l]arge numbers of illegal aliens are often arrested at one time, and conditions are
understandably chaotic." INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 3487 (1984). Justice Powell's
analogy also should be rejected because neither Martinez-Fuerte nor Delgado adequately recognized
the substantial intrusion caused by citizenship questioning, and particularly by the racial aspects of
INS enforcement activity. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 35-65.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 45-51.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
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the overbroad and offensive racial characterizations currently
used-would lower the number of citizens and documented immigrants
exposed to that risk. In addition to being consistent with Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine for other types of police conduct, this rule also would re-
solve the equal protection problems caused now by the INS's extensive use
of race.90
Unlike the INS's use of race, stops at roadblocks are usually con-
strained by neutral criteria, such as the stopping of every car or of cars at
fixed intervals, that minimize the selectivity, on the grounds of race or any
other factor. 1 Drug courier profiles, to the extent that some may include
a racial component, have not been shown to rely on race to the degree that
INS workplace raids do. Although recently there has been more evidence
suggesting that race is a component of the profile, courts have not explic-
itly authorized stops in which race has been a factor.
9 2 Moreover, the
90. By the same reasoning, courts should strike down factors used as surrogates for race, such as
"foreign" appearance, a heavy accent, or inability to speak English, for they too are overbroad and
descriptive of many minority citizens and documented immigrants. Other subjective factors such as
apprehensiveness or furtive behavior should also be scrutinized for racial bias.
It follows, then, that citizenship questioning arising from reasonable suspicion of alienage, in place
of reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage, does not satisfy constitutional guarantees because it relies
heavily on "foreign" appearance. See supra note 84 for cases approving standards based on alienage.
The lower standard is overinclusive not only because citizens are mistaken for aliens but also because
many aliens are documented. The overinclusion affects primarily minorities since aliens-both docu-
mented and undocumented-come predominantly from Latin America and Asia. See Corwin, supra
note 54, at 248-50; Note, The Factory Raid: An Unconstitutional Act?, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 605, 610
(1983); see also supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
In addition, a standard based on reasonable suspicion of alienage is essentially a standard of less
than reasonable suspicion of illegality. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 235 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("[Tihe mere fact that a person is believed to be an alien provides no immedi-
ate grounds for suspecting any illegal activity."). Such a standard would permit arbitrary law enforce-
ment in violation of a core purpose of the Fourth Amendment. A standard of less than reasonable
suspicion is likely to place most workers under suspicion, and the decision to question any particular
individual would be an arbitrary one. The expanded discretion available to INS agents under a lower
standard also would increase the risk that the decision to question a worker is made not on a legiti-
mate basis but on a discriminatory basis, such as racial stereotypes or animosity. Cf. Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (rejecting as arbitrary automobile spot checks without reasonable
suspicion of a violation).
91. See, e.g., State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 579-80, 427 A.2d 131, 133 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1980) (every fifthcar checked); State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Ct. of Arizona, 136 Ariz. 1, 1, 663
P.2d 992, 992 (1983) (en bane) (every car checked).
92. Some courts have mentioned the possible racial factor in drug courier profiles, but have not
made any conclusive statements. For example, in United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982), the court observed that "courts [are] usually sympathetic
toward upholding investigative stops" based on a number of factors, including a defendant's "appear-
ing to be a person of Hispanic background. . . ." Later in the opinion, though, the court stated that,
"[flinally, an end was put to the gradual relaxation of the factors justifying reasonable suspicion by
the Supreme Court in Reid v. Georgia," thus casting some doubt on whether Hispanic appearance
would still be an acceptable factor. Id. at 49. See also United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F.
Supp. 690, 700 n.11 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting that even if race of defendant was added to list of
factors presented, reasonable suspicion not met); United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1346 (2d
Cir. 1979) ("Regarding [dissenting] Judge Oakes' suggestion that Vasquez's possibly Hispanic ap-
pearance played an impermissible role in the decision to stop her, we note that the evidence . . . is
ambiguous at best. When improper police conduct is identified, it must and will be condemned by this
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profiles themselves, even those that apparently do not rely on race, have
received mixed responses from the courts . 3
A second aspect of workplace raids is that the-element of urgency is
generally absent. Because employed undocumented immigrants return to
the workplace every workday, the INS can take more time to investigate
suspected undocumented immigrants with little risk that the workers will
disappear. Furthermore, employed undocumented immigrants pose little
danger of violence to society. 94 Therefore, in the interest of protecting the
rights of innocent workers, it is reasonable to require the INS to conduct
more thorough investigations to develop individualized suspicion before
conducting questioning.
By contrast, the element of urgency is a crucial part of DWI roadblocks
and airport stops. With roadblocks, delay in the apprehension of drunken
drivers poses an immediate risk to public safety. Similarly, a suspected
drug courier who is not immediately apprehended is not likely to return to
the airport the next day and give narcotics agents another chance.
A third aspect of workplace raids is that the harm to innocent individu-
als is significantly greater at the workplace than at roadblocks or airport
stops because of the chilling effect the raids may have on employers. If the
simple presence of Hispanic workers exposes employers to a greater
chance of an expensive and disruptive raid, they may choose not to hire
any Hispanic workers, including citizens and documented immigrants.
Workplace raids, therefore, may be making it "good business" for em-
ployers to discriminate against Hispanics.
The fourth distinguishing feature of workplace raids is the feasibility of
alternative enforcement techniques that serve the public interest in con-
trolling undocumented immigration without causing the Fourth Amend-
ment intrusions or the Fifth Amendment equal protection problems asso-
ciated with racially-based dragnet operations. The constitutional
difficulties aside, workplace raids do not appear even to be the most effi-
cient way to attack undocumented immigration. Quite the contrary, evi-
dence suggests that border enforcement is more efficient than workplace
raids, as measured by the number of undocumented immigrants appre-
hended for each INS agent/hour. In other words, for each undocumented
immigrant the INS captures at a workplace raid, it may have been able to
catch several more-in the same time and with the same number of
Court."), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980); cf. Johnson, supra note 66, at 233-36.
93. See supra note 51.
94. Undocumented immigrants encountered by the INS are rarely armed or dangerous. Those
who are suspected of other crimes usually are investigated by other law enforcement agencies, such as
the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Drug Enforcement Administration. See Harwood, supra
note 2, at 508-09.
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agents-had it instead been patrolling the borders."
5 And, at the border,
the INS is more likely to develop individualized suspicion from direct ob-
servation, such as evidence of recent entry. Given the greater intrusiveness
of workplace raids and the greater efficacy of border patrol, the latter
should be the preferred form of enforcement."
If, despite these reasons to the contrary, the INS continues to question
workers, questioning should be conducted on an individualized basis
rather than through dragnet raids. In the Seventh Circuit, the INS discon-
tinued its dragnet raids pursuant to a court order.
97 The INS instead en-
ters workplaces to look only for particular workers who are suspected of
being undocumented immigrants. Chicago INS investigators have reported
that the new procedures have not hindered their ability to apprehend em-
ployed undocumented immigrants.9 The experience of the INS in Chi-
cago suggests that individualized suspicion can be formulated. The INS
can work with its sources and conduct unobtrusive investigation of a
workplace to refine generalized information into individualized suspicion.
It is reasonable to think that the sources can provide a description or
name to individualize the information.
9
95. Memorandum from Peter Reich to Linda Wong and Bob Wise, INS Data on Enforcement
Efficiency/INS v. Delgado, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (Aug. 2, 1983)
(on file with author). Many commentators have criticized the government for allocating inadequate
resources to the INS in general and to border enforcement in particular. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note
35, at 77-78; Johnson, supra note 66, at 249. A revealing statistic is that the number of INS Border
Patrol officers is only slightly more than twice the number of guards patrolling the U.S. Capitol, or
roughly 2800 compared to 1200. See Schuck, supra note 30, at 77-78.
96. The government may contend that the apprehension of employed undocumented immigrants
serves the additional purpose of making jobs available for lawfully present individuals. Research on
the longer term effects of workplace raids suggests instead that employers re-hire the same or hire
other undocumented immigrants, not citizens or documented immigrants, to fill the job openings cre-
ated by raids. For example, studies and reports from various cities found that the jobs vacated because
of Operation Jobs eventually were occupied again by undocumented immigrants. Citizens and docu-
mented immigrants either did not apply for those jobs or, if they did and were hired, quit within a
short period. This occurred even though Operation Jobs targeted seemingly desirable, higher-paying
jobs. See "Dirty Work": Americans Turn Down Many Jobs Vacated by Ouster of Aliens, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 6, 1982, at 1, col. 1; see also Note, supra note 32, at 611-12 (describing major INS workplace
raids in which 80% of those deported returned to same jobs within three months).
97. See Comment, supra note 29, at 669.
98. See id. The Third Circuit, rather than require individualized suspicion, has found that the
questioning of all workers is a means of constraining INS discretion. See Babula v. INS, 665 F.2d
293, 296-97 (3d Cir. 1981). That approach is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, it is often
impossible for the INS to question every worker. See ILGWU v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir.
1982) (INS admitting that limitation), rev'd sub nom. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984). Second,
though the Third Circuit's approach eliminates selectivity as to who is questioned, questioning all
workers increases the overall intrusiveness. The intrusiveness of the raids arises not only from selec-
tive questioning but also from the questions asked, see supra note 32 and accompanying text, and
imposing the questioning on all workers would only aggravate the latter problem. Third, even the
selectivity itself would be only marginally affected. Since the INS enters most workplaces with the
owner's consent, the choice of the establishment itself is unconstrained, and is made primarily on the
basis of the racial composition of the workforce. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
99. Unobtrusive surveillance and investigation may determine the suspected individual's name,
which may reveal whether the person has been deported previously. The use of an assumed name may
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Overall, therefore, the circumstances surrounding workplace raids bol-
ster the conclusion that the authority of the INS to question workers
should not exceed that of the police to conduct Terry stops. Under the
Fourth Amendment, the existence of feasible alternatives indicates that the
INS should pursue those possibilities rather than the more intrusive drag-
net operations. 10 Under the Fifth Amendment, the availability of alterna-
tives shows that racially-based workplace raids are unconstitutional be-
cause they are not necessary to achieve the governmental interest.' 01
Consequently, racially-based workplace raids cannot withstand constitu-
tional attack under either the Fourth or Fifth Amendment.10 2
CONCLUSION
Despite the national concern over the presence of undocumented immi-
grants, courts should be loath to diminish privacy and personal security,
particularly when the sacrifice is made mainly by minorities. As this Note
has shown, citizenship questioning by the INS interferes substantially
with liberties guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The use of race by
the INS increases the Fourth Amendment invasion and violates equal pro-
tection under the Fifth Amendment. There is no adequate justification for
allowing the INS to deviate from the constitutional norms established for
the police. To protect fully the rights of all citizens and documented immi-
grants, and especially those who are members of minority groups, the INS
should be barred from questioning workers unless it has individualized
reasonable suspicion based on nonracial factors that each person ques-
tioned is an undocumented immigrant.
contribute to individualized suspicion.
100. The Fourth Amendment requires the government to use the "least intrusive means reasona-
bly available." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion); see id. at 511 n.*
(Brennan, J., concurring in the result).
101. See hote 76 and accompanying text.
102. As this Note has shown that the police standard for detentive seizures is appropriate for
nondetentive INS seizures, it should be evident that a standard at least that stringent must be applied
to detentive INS seizures.
